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We provide a simple security proof for prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocols
employing noisy processing and one-way postprocessing of the key. This is achieved by showing that the
security of such a protocol is equivalent to that of an associated key distribution protocol in which, instead
of the usual maximally entangled states, a more general private state is distilled. In addition to a more
general target state, the usual entanglement distillation tools are employed (in particular, Calderbank-
Shor-Steane–like codes), with the crucial difference that noisy processing allows some phase errors to be
left uncorrected without compromising the privacy of the key.
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Entanglement has been the cornerstone of many quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) security proofs to date: A
prepare and measure protocol by which Alice and Bob
generate a secret key can be shown to be secure exactly
when an associated entanglement distillation protocol suc-
ceeds in producing a high-fidelity maximally entangled
state. Secrecy of the key then follows since maximal en-
tanglement can be shared only between two parties [1–8].
The resulting proofs are intuitive and allow QKD designers
to incorporate current methods of quantum error correction
and entanglement distillation.
Renner, Gisin, and Kraus adopt a more information-
theoretic approach to QKD security with the surprising
result that secure key can be established at noise levels
beyond what seems possible in the entanglement-based
picture [9]. By including a step in which Alice adds noise
to her sifted key, the overall key rate can actually increase.
The additional noise damages the correlations held by
Alice and Bob but the key observation is that this noise
may damage Eve’s correlations even more. While the best
known upper bounds for one-way distillable entanglement
do not rule out the possibility of distilling EPR pairs for
these noise levels, it is puzzling that this processing can
generate key at rates well in excess of the best known
entanglement distillation rates [10]. Thus, it has been un-
clear whether an entanglement-based security proof is
possible for these protocols.
We find a resolution in the observation of [11] that
maximally entangled states are not strictly necessary for
generating secret keys. Instead, states leading to secret
keys belong to the class of private states. These are com-
posed of completely correlated systems A and B containing
a uniformly distributed key, along with shield systems A0
and B0. More precisely,  is called a d-dimensional private
state (or pdit) if there are unitaries Uj and a twisting
operator of the form Utwist  PjjjjihjjjAB UjA0B0 , such
that   UtwistjdihdjAB  A0B0 Uytwist for some A0B0 ,
where jdi  Pdi1 jiii= dp . The twisting operator ensures
that, while Alice and Bob may not share a maximally
entangled state, Eve’s reduced state is independent of the
key. This definition recalls an earlier result [12] that the
secrecy of key created from entangled systems is not
diminished by phase noise in the devices performing the
entanglement distillation.
In [13] it was shown that a large number of low fidelity
copies of a private state can sometimes be distilled to a
high-fidelity private state with the same shield but smaller
key system. However, it is not clear what class of QKD
protocols can be coherently recast in the form considered
by [13]. As we will see, the coherent version of the protocol
of [9] is quite different from those of [13]—the initial
adversarially distributed state will be noisy EPR pairs
(with no shield), and the shield of the final private state
arises due to Alice and Bob’s noisy processing (Fig. 1).
In the following, we show that a prepare and measure
QKD scheme with noisy processing and one-way postpro-
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FIG. 1. The effective state held by Alice, Bob, and Eve after
noisy processing, where j’qi 

1 qp j0i  qp j1i, juvi P
u;v

puv
p juvi, and A0 is the purification of the noise Alice
adds. CSS-like error correction on the AB system is equivalent to
classical error correction and privacy amplification on the key in
the prepare and measure protocol, and securely provides key
exactly when it maps many copies of the above state to a high-
fidelity private state for all puv consistent with the estimated
parameters. The shield consists of the A0 systems together with
the CSS code’s syndrome bits held by Bob.
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cessing is secure exactly when an associated pdit distilla-
tion protocol has high fidelity. This requires only minor
modifications of the standard entanglement distillation
argument. Indeed, in the coherent description of the noisy
processing protocol the auxiliary system purifying the
noise introduced by Alice will function as a shield, and
the sifted key will become noisy EPR pairs in the key
system of a noisy pdit. The error correction and privacy
amplification required in the classical processing maps to a
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)-like quantum code on the
key system in the coherent protocol in the same way as
found in [2]. If the CSS code performs a suitable amount of
bit and phase error correction on the key system, Alice and
Bob will be left with a high-fidelity private state. The
crucial difference from previous entanglement-based se-
curity proofs is that Alice and Bob need not correct every
phase error to guarantee security, and this savings will
often more than compensate for the associated increase
in the number of bit errors they must correct. In fact, we
can establish key at bit-error rates up to 12.4% for the
Bennett-Brassard-84 (BB84) protocol [14] and 14.1% for
the six-state protocol, matching the rates of [9] and sur-
passing all previous thresholds from entanglement-based
proofs.
Private state distillation.—We begin with a coherent
reformulation of the BB84 and six-state protocols [1,2];
other protocols can be handled in a similar manner [8]. In
both cases, Alice first prepares the state jiAB and sends
the B system to Bob. In BB84 (six state), each party then
randomly measures in the X or Z basis (X, Y, or Z) and by
public discussion they sift out those outcomes correspond-
ing to the same basis choice. This is equivalent to Alice
(Bob) sending a random bit in (measuring in) one of the
bases at random, since the statistics of measurements as
well as an eavesdropper Eve’s dependence on their out-
comes are identical in both cases. Alice and Bob then
publicly compare a small fraction of the sifted key to
estimate the noise level of the channel.
If the noise level is zero, the resulting length-n sifted key
can be described coherently as jin. Otherwise, the most
general noisy channels we need to consider are Pauli
channels, since all subsequent operations will commute
with a (hypothetical) measurement in the Bell basis which
digitizes the actual noise into this form [1,6]. The only
difference here to the original classicization argument of
Lo and Chau [1] is that Alice flips some key bits, which
also commutes with the Bell-state measurement.
Attributing the noise to Eve, the key state is
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u;v

puv
p IA  XuBZvBjinABjuiE1 jviE2 ; (1)
where puv is the probability of error pattern XuZv de-
scribed by length-n bit strings u and v. Furthermore, if
Alice and Bob randomly permute their n systems, it is
sufficient to consider noise that is independent and identi-
cally distributed (IID) for each transmitted qubit, given by
rate puv. This follows from a slight variant of Lemma 3 of
[6] (see also [2,4]), the particulars of which we take up
after the detailed analysis of the next section.
Alice and Bob now distill the key by performing bit error
correction and privacy amplification (phase error correc-
tion). Before this, Alice adds IID noise to A, randomly
applying X at rate q. This is described coherently as using
an auxiliary system A0 in the state j’iA0 

1 qp j0i 
q
p j1i as the control system in a CNOT gate, yielding the
state
 
X
u;v;f

puvqf
p jfiA0 XfA  XuBZvBjinABjuiE1 jviE2 ; (2)
where qf  qjfj1 qnjfj for length-n bit string f and jfj
its Hamming weight. We can also think of Alice’s error
operator acting on Bob’s system, since X  XZ and I 
XZX have the same effect on ji.
Now Alice and Bob perform bit error correction using a
linear error-correcting code. This step is the same as the
usual analysis, since all bit errors must be corrected in the
final key. The bit-error rate is ~p  px1 q  q1 px
for px  Pvp1;v, so Alice and Bob must measure nH2~p
parity syndromes, where H2 is the binary Shannon entropy,
in order to identify the error pattern with high probability.
To simplify the resulting expressions, we use the method of
decoupling error correction and privacy amplification [15],
itself based on the breeding entanglement distillation pro-
tocol [16], whereby syndromes are collected in auxiliary
entangled pairs.
Alice collects the bit parities in her halves of the ancilla
states, measures them, and sends the result to Bob. Bob
then coherently corrects system B and records the error in
an ancilla system B0, producing
 
X
u;v;f

puvqf
p
ZvA0 jfiA0 ju fiB0ZvBjinABjuiE1 jviE2 ; (3)
where ZvA0 comes from interchanging X
f
B and ZvB.
In the classical description of the protocol, this step
requires Alice to encrypt her measurement outcomes
with a one-time pad, preventing information leakage to
Eve. This encryption requires a key, which in the coherent
description is a private state, meaning Alice and Bob
generally collect the parity syndromes in the key subsys-
tems of private states, not in maximally entangled states as
we have used. However, there is no loss of generality in
using maximally entangled states in the formalism, since
using private states raises no additional complications
[13,17].
At this stage, the normal entanglement-based proof
would proceed to correct all phase errors. This would not
give the key rates of [9] as the extra noise would just reduce
the rates from those of [2]. Instead, we come to the main
observation of this Letter: not all phase errors must be
corrected. After correcting enough, the resulting state
will be close to a private state.
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Examining Alice and Bob’s state makes clear how this
comes about. Tracing out Eve’s systems, they hold
   CA0B0
X
u;v
puvuB0 ’vA0ZvBnABZvB

CyA0B0 ; (4)
where   jihj, j’vi  Zvj’in, and we have used a
CNOT CA0B0 to write jfiA0 ju fiB0 as CA0B0 jfiA0 juiB0 .
By performing phase error correction at a reduced rate,
the pattern of phase errors will not be uniquely identified,
but only narrowed to a setV s indexed by the syndrome s:
V s  fvjsyndromev  sg. The key point is that if the
vectors j’vi for v 2 V s were mutually orthogonal, we
could define the unitary DA0B  Pv2V s’vA0  ZvB and
use UBA0B0  DA0BCA0B0 to untwist:
 0  UBA0B0UyBA0B0
 nAB 
X
u
puuB0
X
v2V s
pvju’vA0

: (5)
Since D is a controlled-Z gate, either system can be
thought of as the control, so DA0B  PjUjA0  jB for
some unitaries Uj. UBA0B0 is a twisting operation, so that
Alice and Bob would share a private state. Keys derived
from this state would be secret.
Detailed analysis.—To establish the secrecy of keys
generated from , recall the universally composable defi-
nition of security from [18,19]. A key K is called  secure
if the state KE of the key and eavesdropper satisfies
jjKE    Ejj1 	 2, where  is a uniform mixture of
all key values, shared by Alice and Bob. The latter state is a
perfect key and this definition ensures that KE can safely
be used for any further cryptographic purpose.
In the present context, the key is created by measuring
systems A and B of  in the Z basis. As the untwisting
operation is unitary and commutes with the measurement,
whether it is performed before the measurement or after
does not affect the key’s security. When performing the
untwisting operation on the unmeasured state results in a
maximally entangled state on AB, the key generated will be
perfectly secure. Similarly, if there is an untwisting opera-
tion mapping AB to within 2 of a maximally entangled
state, the key is  secure [11].
For simplicity we consider independent amplitude and
phase errors, with the case of correlated u and v following
along similar lines. To construct an untwisting operation, it
suffices to find a rank-one positive operator valued mea-
sure with elements Ev that can distinguish the j’vi with
average error Pe no larger than 2=2: Pe  hPvei P
v;v0vpvh’vjEv0 j’vi 	 2=2, where Pve is the probability
of decoding input state j’vi incorrectly. This problem was
considered by [20] in the context of transmitting classical
information over a quantum channel. Letting  
1 pzj’ih’j  pzZj’ih’jZ, pz 
P
upu1, and S be
the entropy of , their results imply that with probability
1 2=2 the elements of a randomly chosen subsetV s 

V of size 2nS can be distinguished by the pretty-
good measurement (PGM) with average error probability
2=2, where  decreases exponentially with n for arbi-
trarily small positive .
The PGM has rank-one elements by construction [21],
so we have Ev  j~vih~vj for unnormalized j~vi. Then
we can append another auxiliary system A00 and con-
sider the Neumark extension consisting of orthonor-
mal states jviA0A00 in the joint Hilbert space A0A00 such
that A0A00hvj’v0 iA0 j0iA00 A0 h~vj’viA0 [22]. With this,
we can finally construct the untwisting operator U 
PvvA0A00  ZvBCyA0B0 .
Letting ~  j0ih0j  , the fidelity of U~Uy with
0  nAB 
P
u;vpu;vvA0A00  uB0 is given by
FU~Uy; 0  Pu;vpuvjh’vj~vij  h Pvsp i, where Pvs is
the conditional probability of successful transmission of
v. Since h Pvsp i  hPvsi  1 Pe  1 2=2, using the
relation between trace norm and fidelity [23], we find
jjU~Uy  0jj1 	 2

1 F2
p
	 2, proving  security.
A subtlety arises in the use of the Neumark extension in
that our untwisting operation consists of controlled isome-
tries rather than unitaries. However, the privacy of the key
is uncompromised: while Eve may have knowledge of the
shield system, as long as Alice and Bob hold the key and
shield, the fact that they could be untwisted implies that
Eve is ignorant of the key.
Above, we took u and v to be independent. If they are
not, randomly choosing setsV s of size 2nSju, where
Sju is the conditional entropy of  given u, leads to an
exponentially small average probability of decoding error
for the PGM, and the rest of the argument remains un-
changed [3]. Putting this all together, by using a random
code Alice and Bob can select a subset V s of size
2nSju. With probability exponentially close to 1, the
untwisting operation can be constructed from the pretty-
good measurement, ensuring the key is  secure.
Finally, we must consider the effects of non-IID noise,
e.g., arising from a coherent eavesdropping attack. By
random sampling, Alice and Bob obtain an estimate festu;v
of the fraction, or type, of Pauli errors XuZv. Since the raw
key bits are permutation invariant, jfestu;v  ftrueu;v j 	 " with
probability exponentially close (in n) to unity [24]. This
allows us to prove that the above procedure is secure for
any input state yielding estimate festu;v, not just those sub-
jected to IID noise. First, decompose the squared fidelity
for an IID input state with error rate pu;v  festu;v into a sum
over possible types f: F2  Pfprobfjp  festF2f, where
probfjp  fest is the probability of type f in the IID
distribution, Ff is the fidelity our protocol produces on a
uniform distribution over errors of type f, and we have
suppressed the u, v indices. Since there are only polyno-
mially many types, all those with non-negligible probabil-
ity must have polynomially large probability and thus
corresponding fidelities Ff which are exponentially close
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to 1. Since types within " of the rate p are among the
probable types [25], this guarantees that the above proce-
dure produces high-fidelity entangled output states (or
securely aborts) for any input state yielding fest.
Achievable key rates.—What key generation rates can be
achieved by the protocols considered above? The bit-error-
correction step consumes nH2~p previously established
secret key bits, but in so doing produces n bit-error-free
bits. The phase error correction must reduce the number of
phase errors from 2nHvju to 2nSju (which can be accom-
plished by a random phase code with nHvju  Sju
syndrome bits) in order to ensure that Alice and Bob could
untwist the state, so we find an overall rate of 1H2~p 
Hvju  Sju, or
 R  1H2~p 
X
u
puH2p1ju H2	u ; (6)
where 	u  12 1 

1  16q1  qp1ju1  p1ju
q

is the larger eigenvalue of u  1  p1juj’ih’j
p1juZj’ih’jZ.
In the BB84 protocol, bit and phase errors are equal but
uncorrelated, meaning p1ju  pz  px  p1jv, from
which we find an error threshold of 12.4% by letting
q ! 1=2. In the six-state protocol all Pauli errors occur
at the same rate, giving a threshold error rate of 14.1%.
Discussion.—We have shown that one-way key distri-
bution protocols employing noisy processing can be seen
as distillation protocols for private states where the purifi-
cation of the added noise functions as part of the shield and
the error-correction and privacy amplification steps map to
a CSS code in the usual way. This extends the entangle-
ment distillation paradigm initiated in [1,2], providing a
cleaner and less technical security proof for the protocols
of [9]. Further, by formulating the protocol in this way, we
gain insight into the mechanism by which addition of noise
improves key rates, namely, by deflecting Eve’s correla-
tions with Alice and Bob to the shield and away from the
key.
In the security proof of the six-state protocol [3], build-
ing on the work of [26], Lo showed that a degenerate error-
correcting code could be used to improve the threshold
error rate from 12.6% to 12.7%. Further progress in this
direction can be found in [27], where we report on the
combination of that method with the noisy processing
studied here, showing that the threshold error rate of
BB84 can be increased from 12.4% to 12.9%. We believe
our findings will point towards new methods of key dis-
tillation and analogous methods of private state distillation,
furthering the fruitful exchange between privacy amplifi-
cation and entanglement distillation.
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